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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is defendant Suzanne J. Lamb's appeal from a final judgment entered by the 
district court after a bench trial on the parties' competing breach-of-contract claims and 
plaintiff Robert Pearson dba Robert Pearson Construction's mechanic's lien foreclosure 
action. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-
3(2)0) (2002). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in not dismissing 
Pearson's mechanic's lien foreclosure action based on Pearson's failure to comply with 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) when he served his complaint on Lamb. 
Lamb preserved that issue for review in her Supplemental Motion for 
Reconsideration and Objection to Proposed Judgment (R. 371-76). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) & (e) (2001)1: 
(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this 
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien 
claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of 
the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's 
rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable 
the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner 
may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
* * * 
(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the residence the 
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection 4(a), the lien 
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the 
residence. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-102(15), (16) & (20) (2001): 
(15) "Owner" means a person who: 
(a) contracts with a person who is licensed as a contractor or is 
exempt from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah 
Construction Trades Licensing Act, for the construction on an 
owner-occupied residence upon real property owned by that 
person; 
1
 The Title 38 provisions set forth in this section, which were in effect in 2002 when 
Pearson served his complaint on Lamb, were amended by the Legislature this year. See 
2004 Utah Laws Ch. 42 (H.B. 62) & Ch. 85 (H.B. 32). None of those amendments, 
however, is relevant to the issue before this Court, which must only construe the 2002 
versions of the applicable Title 38 provisions. 
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(b) contracts with a real estate developer to buy a residence upon 
completion of the construction on the owner-occupied residence; or 
(c) buys a residence from a real estate developer after completion 
of the construction on the owner-occupied residence. 
(16) "Owner-occupied residence" means a residence that is, or after 
completion of the construction on the residence will be, occupied by the 
owner or the owner's tenant or lessee as a primary or secondary residence 
within 180 days from the date of the completion of the construction on the 
residence. 
* * * 
(20) "Residence" means an improvement to real property used or 
occupied, to be used or occupied as, or in conjunction with, a primary or 
secondary detached single-family dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to 
two units, including factory built housing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
In October 2002, Pearson, a licensed in Utah, sued Lamb, a California resident, 
for breach of contract and to foreclose on a mechanic's lien based on construction work 
that Pearson had done at Lamb's rental property, a house located at 2547 Holladay 
Ranch Loop Road in Park City, Utah (Park Meadows house), for which he claimed 
Lamb had not completely paid him. Complaint (R. 1-9); Amended Memorandum 
Decision (hereafter "Decision") at 1, 3 (R. 240, 242). Lamb counterclaimed for 
breach of contract. She alleged that she and her late husband had entered into a fixed-
price contract with Pearson for the work he performed (as opposed to the contract for 
cost of materials and labor plus a fee Pearson alleged the parties had), that she had paid 
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him all that was due under that contract, and that Pearson owed her money for the cost 
of completing the work he had agreed but failed to do for the fixed price. Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim (R. 32-42); Decision at 1-2 (R. 240-41). 
After a bench trial, the trial court found in Pearson's favor on both the breach-
of-contract claim and the lien foreclosure action. Decision (R. 240-53). Before entry 
of judgment, Lamb filed a motion for reconsideration (motion for a new trial), in which 
she argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Pearson's lien foreclosure 
action because he had failed to comply with UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) 
when he served his complaint on Lamb. Def. Lamb's Supp. Motion for 
Reconsideration and Objection to Proposed Judgment (hereafter "Supp. Motion") (R. 
371-76). The court rejected that argument and denied Lamb's motion. Ruling and 
Order (hereafter "Ruling") (R. 476-77; attached as Addendum 1 to this brief). The 
court subsequently entered judgment for Pearson, awarding him a principal judgment of 
$19,023 (plus interest) and attorney fees and costs of $42,379.37 ($41,808.75 in fees 
and $570.97 in costs). Final Order and Judgment (R. 483-86; attached as Addendum 2 
to this brief)); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Support of Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. 510-15). 
Lamb timely filed a notice of appeal. (R. 490-92). Thereafter, she partially 
satisfied the judgment against her by paying Pearson $22,967.75, leaving an 
outstanding judgment of $42,379.72 plus post-judgment interest, the bulk of which 
represents an award of attorney fees under the mechanic's lien statutes. Partial 
A 
Satisfaction of Judgment (R. 493-96). In the trial court, Lamb has moved for a stay of 
the outstanding judgment pending resolution of this appeal, which Pearson has not 
opposed. (R. 516-22). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
It is undisputed that when Pearson served his complaint on Lamb, she had leased 
out the Park Meadows house as a primary residence to a lessee; in fact, the house had 
always been a rental property for Lamb and her husband (who died before Pearson filed 
this lawsuit). Decision at 1, 3, 7, 10-11 (R. 240, 242, 246, 249-50). It also is 
undisputed that Pearson did not include with the service of his complaint on Lamb the 
instructions and forms described in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001). See 
Mem. in Opposition to Def. Lamb's Suppl. Motion for Reconsideration and Objection 
to Proposed Judgment (R. 390-99). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001), a provision within Utah's 
mechanic's lien statutes, a lien claimant who files an action against an owner of a 
residence homeowner to enforce a mechanic's lien must serve on the owner certain 
instructions and forms with the complaint that initiates the action. If the lien claimant 
fails to do that, the claimant is barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien. §38-1-
ll(4)(e). In short, section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) is a jurisdictional provision, and a lien 
claimant's failure to comply with its requirements deprives a court of jurisdiction to 
hear the claimant's lien foreclosure action. 
In the instant case, Pearson, a lien claimant who had brought an action to 
foreclose on the mechanic's lien he had filed against a residence owned by Lamb, did 
not serve the instructions and forms identified in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) with the lien 
foreclosure complaint he served on Lamb. The trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction 
to hear Pearson's lien foreclosure action. Because a jurisdictional defect cannot be 
waived or stipulated around and can be raised at any time by any party, Lamb properly 
asked the court to dismiss Pearson's lien foreclosure action based on lack of jurisdiction 
in a motion filed before the entry of judgment. The court erroneously denied that 
motion. Further, it erroneously awarded Pearson attorney fees under the mechanic's 
lien statutes. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of 
Pearson on the lien foreclosure action and with respect to attorney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in not dismissing Pearson's mechanic's lien foreclosure action 
based on Pearson's failure to comply with UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) (2001) 
when he served his complaint on Lamb. 
A. Standard of Review 
The trial court's determination that it had jurisdiction to consider Pearson's 
mechanic's lien foreclosure action presents a question of law; therefore, this Court 
reviews that decision for correctness, owing the trial court no deference. State v. Lara, 
2003 UT App 318, f 10, 79 P.3d 951 ("Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction 
is a question of law that we review for correctness."). 
B. Under the plain language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) & (e) (2001), 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Pearson's mechanic's lien 
foreclosure action; therefore, that action should have been dismissed and 
Pearson's request for an award of attorney fees denied. 
The issue on appeal is straightforward: Did the trial court err in concluding that 
it had jurisdiction with respect to Pearson's mechanic's lien foreclosure action in light 
of his failure to comply with UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) when he served 
his complaint on Lamb? The resolution of that issue is critical to determining whether 
Pearson is entitled to recover attorney fees, given that his right to a fee award is based 
solely on his prevailing party status under the mechanic's lien statutes. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 38-1-18(1) (2001) (providing for recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing 
party "in any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter"). 
In rejecting Lamb's argument that jurisdiction was lacking and that Pearson's 
mechanic's lien action therefore should be dismissed, the trial court concluded that the 
argument had been "waived" because it was "not advanced at trial," and further that it 
failed on the merits "for the reasons advanced by [Pearson] in the opposition[] memos 
relating to [Lamb's] motionQ." Ruling at 1-2 (R. 476-77) (Addendum 1). For the 
following reasons, the court erred in concluding that the alleged jurisdictional defect 
had been waived and that, in any event, as Pearson argued, it had jurisdiction to hear 
the mechanic's lien action. 
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1. Background 
Before trial, the parties' attorneys agreed to submit certain stipulations of fact to 
the court in an effort to expedite the presentation of their respective cases. See 
Stipulations of Fact and Admissibility of Exhibits (R. 156-60) (hereafter 
"Stipulations"). Among those stipulations was the following: 
Mr. Pearson has complied with all statutory procedural requirements for 
perfecting and foreclosing on a mechanics' lien, and the Notice of Claim 
of Lien filed with the Summit County Recorder's office on or about June 
19, 2002, meets these statutory procedural requirements; Mrs. Lamb does 
not defend against Mr. Pearson's mechanics' lien claim on these statutory 
procedural grounds, but simply challenges his right to receive payment of 
the amounts claimed in the lien. 
Stipulations at 3, 1 11 (R. 158). But, as became apparent to Lamb's attorney before the 
entry of judgment, when counsel submitted that stipulation to the court, they had 
overlooked section 38-1-1 l(4)(a)'s strict requirements for perfecting the right to enforce 
a mechanic's lien and the jurisdictional issue the statute presented. 
Under section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), a lien claimant seeking to foreclose on a mechanics' 
lien must comply with the following provisions: 
If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this 
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien 
claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of 
the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the 
owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable 
the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the 
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owner may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
"If a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the residence the instructions and form 
affidavit required by Subsection 4(a), the lien claimant shall be barred from maintaining 
or enforcing the lien upon the residence." § 38-1-1 l(4)(e). 
In a motion for reconsideration (new trial) filed after trial but before entry of 
judgment, Lamb cited Pearson's failure to comply with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) and 
argued that (1) the court therefore was deprived of jurisdiction to consider Pearson's 
lien foreclosure action and (2) the parties' pretrial stipulation, which was based on 
counsel's mutual mistake regarding the facts and the law, could not cure the 
jurisdictional defect. Supp. Motion (R. 371-76). Pearson responded with two 
arguments: (1) the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act (Residence 
Lien Act) does not protect owners of residential rental property like Lamb and thus 
Pearson was not required to comply with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), and (2) in any event, 
Lamb waived her argument for dismissal of Pearson's lien foreclosure action under 
section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) by stipulating that he had complied with all of the statutory 
requirements for perfecting and foreclosing on a mechanic's lien. Mem. in Oppos. to 
Def. Lamb's Supp. Motion for Reconsid. and Obj. to Proposed Judgment (R. 390-99) 
(hereafter "Mem. in Oppos."). The trial court adopted both of those arguments and 
denied Lamb's motion. 
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2. Discussion 
a. Section 38-1-11(4) (a) applied to Pearson 
Section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) requires a lien claimant who files an action to enforce a 
mechanic's lien involving a "residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102," to include 
with service of the complaint on the "owner of the residence" "instructions to the 
owner of the residence relating to the owner's rights under [the Residence Lien Act]" 
and "a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner of the 
residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner may exercise available rights 
under [the Residence Lien Act]." As previously noted, the trial court adopted 
Pearson's argument that subsection (4)(a) did not apply to him because the Residence 
Lien Act, as he interpreted it, does not protect an owner of residential rental property. 
See Mem. in Oppos. at 3-4 (R. 392-93) ("The provisions of the Residential Lien Act, 
and the corresponding provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Act, are * * * intended to 
protect the primary and secondary residences of the owner and not the owners of pure 
rental properties such as the Park Meadows Property." (emphasis in original)). 
The key terms in subsection (4)(a) for purposes of analyzing that argument are 
"owner" and "residence." The definitions of those terms are found in UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 38-11-102 (2001), a provision in the Residence Lien Act. "Residence" is 
defined as "an improvement to real property used or occupied, to be used or occupied 
as, or in conjunction with, a primary or secondary detached single-family dwelling or 
multifamily dwelling up to two units, including factory built housing." § 38-11-
10 
102(20). The definition of "owner" relevant to this case is the following: "[A] person 
who * * * contracts with a person who is licensed as a contractor or is exempt from 
licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, for the 
construction on an owner-occupied residence upon real property owned by that 
person." § 38-ll-102(15)(a). An "owner-occupied residence" is "a residence that is, 
or after completion of the construction on the residence will be, occupied by the owner 
or the owner's tenant or lessee as a primary or secondary residence within 180 days 
from the date of the completion of the construction on the residence." § 38-11-
102(16). 
Those definitions make clear that as used in the Residence Lien Act (and thus in 
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a)), the term "owner" includes a person, like Lamb, who owns a 
"residence," like the Park Meadows house, and leases it out as a primary or secondary 
residence. That is express in subsections (15)(a) and (16) of 38-11-102: an "owner" is 
one who contracts with a licensed contractor, like Pearson, for construction on an 
"owner-occupied residence," the definition of which includes "a residence that is * * * 
occupied by * * * the owner's tenant or lessee as a primary or secondary residence" -
precisely the situation at Lamb's Park Meadows house. 
In sum, the plain language of the Residential Lien Act's definitional section 
refutes Pearson's contention that the Act is not intended to protect an owner of a 
residential rental property like Lamb. Indeed, Lamb was "the owner of the residence" 
under section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) whom Pearson was required to serve in accordance with 
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that section for purposes of his lien foreclosure action. In concluding otherwise, 
Pearson and the trial court simply misread the relevant statutes. 
b. Pearson's failure to comply with the requirements of section 38-l-ll(4)(a) 
is a jurisdictional defect, which cannot be stipulated around or cured by 
waiver. 
Pearson's alternative argument to the trial court was that even assuming section 
38-1-1 l(4)(a) applied to him, Lamb waived any argument for dismissal of the lien 
foreclosure action based on his noncompliance with that provision. Specifically, in 
challenging Lamb's contention that there could be no waiver because section 38-1-11(4) 
is a jurisdictional provision, Pearson argued (1) there is no case law supporting that 
characterization, and (2) Lamb's stipulation that Pearson had complied with all of the 
relevant statutory requirements for enforcing his lien cannot be avoided by 
mischaracterizing section 38-1-11(4) as a jurisdictional provision. The trial court 
adopted that alternative argument as well. 
The issues for this Court, therefore, reduce to whether section 38-1-11(4) is 
jurisdictional, such that Pearson's failure to comply with it constitutes a jurisdictional 
defect, and whether that defect could be waived through the parties' erroneous 
stipulation that Pearson had complied with all of the statutory requirements for 
enforcing his lien. 
The discussion of those issues necessarily begins with an examination of the 
plain language of section 38-1-11(4). As previously noted, subsection (4)(a) requires a 
lien claimant to serve on a defendant homeowner certain instructions and forms when 
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the complaint to enforce a mechanic's lien is served. In subsection (4)(e), the 
Legislature explicitly set forth the consequence of a lien claimant's failure to comply 
with (4)(a): "If a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the residence the 
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection 4(a), the lien claimant shall be 
barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the residence." In short, the 
Legislature made clear what happens when a lien claimant fails to comply with (4)(a): 
the claimant may not maintain the lien or go into court to enforce it. The Legislature's 
intent to preclude judicial enforcement of the lien in the absence of the lien claimant's 
compliance with (4)(a) could not be more clearly expressed. At bottom, a court is 
deprived of jurisdiction to hear a lien foreclosure action when the lien claimant fails to 
comply with (4)(a). 
That conclusion is supported by a well-established methodology for determining 
whether a statutory procedural requirement is jurisdictional. Whether such a 
requirement is jurisdictional depends on whether it is "mandatory" (jurisdictional) or 
merely "directory" (not jurisdictional). Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). A court is "guided in construing the 
language of [a] statute by the principle that generally a direction in a statute to do an act 
is considered 'mandatory' when consequences are attached to the failure to act. 
Conversely, when a statute requires an action to be taken without prescribing a penalty 
for failure to so act, the requirement is not often deemed mandatory." Stahl v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980). 
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Applying those principles here, section 38-1-11(4) plainly is a mandatory, and 
thus jurisdictional, provision. The statute requires that a lien claimant do an act (viz., 
include with service of the lien foreclosure complaint on the owner of a residence 
certain items concerning the Residential Lien Act) and expressly attaches consequences 
to the failure to do the prescribed act (v/z., the lien claimant is barred from maintaining 
or enforcing the lien). § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) & (e). In that sense, section 38-1-11(4) is 
identical to the statutes at issue in Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) 
(construing the notice of claim provisions in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act), 
because they all contain a precondition to suit which, when not satisfied, deprives the 
trial court of jurisdiction. As the Madsen court explained: 
Section 63-30-11 sets out the notice requirement [for filing suit against a 
governmental entity], and section 63-30-12 spells out the effect of failing 
to comply with the requirement [("A claim against the state is barred 
unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general and the agency 
concerned within one year after the cause of action arises.")]. Section 63-
30-11 provides that before a plaintiff may maintain an action against the 
State, he or she must file a notice of claim with the appropriate state 
entity. Section 63-30-12 provides that an action against the State is barred 
if the required notice is not filed. It therefore makes failure to give notice 
grounds for dismissal. A plain reading of those sections indicates that no 
suit against the State may be maintained if notice is not given. We 
therefore conclude that service of notice is a precondition to suit. 
769 P.2d at 249 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
Like the statutory notice requirement discussed in Madsen, the requirements of 
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) are a precondition to suit. And like the statutes in Madsen, 
section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) provides that a suit is "barred" if that precondition is not satisfied. 
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Failure to satisfy a statutory precondition to suit, which was the result of Pearson's 
failure to comply with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. 
Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, 1 10, 67 P.3d 466 ("A plaintiffs failure 
to comply with the [Utah Governmental Immunity Act]'s notice of claim provisions 
deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction."); Madsen, 769 P.2d at 250 
("Because the plaintiffs in Madsen I did not give the required notice and therefore 
failed to satisfy a precondition to suit, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
merits of their claim."). 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear Pearson's lien foreclosure action due to Pearson's failure to comply with section 
38-1-1 l(4)(a). Because "lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by any party or 
the court," Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transportation, 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992), Lamb properly presented the jurisdictional issue to the trial court in her 
post-trial, prejudgment motion. Because a jurisdictional defect cannot be waived or 
stipulated around, Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199, 1 12, 29 P.3d 13, the parties' 
erroneous stipulation that Pearson had complied with all of the statutory requirements 
for enforcement of his lien did not preclude consideration of the jurisdictional issue. 
The trial court therefore should have dismissed Pearson's lien foreclosure action. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) ("whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or 
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss 
the action"); Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 540 ("In fact, Rule 12(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
15 
Civil Procedure requires this court to dismiss the claim against UDOT if the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction." (emphasis in original)). There being no valid lien foreclosure 
action, the court also should have denied Pearson's request for an award of attorney 
fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
judgment in favor of Pearson on his mechanic's lien foreclosure action and dismiss that 
action. The Court also should reverse the trial court's award of attorney fees, as he is 
not a prevailing party under the mechanic's lien statutes. Finally, based on those 
reversals, the Court should remand the case to the trial court with directions to award 
Lamb her reasonable attorney fees and costs in defending against Pearson's invalid lien 
foreclosure action. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Because this case presents the first opportunity for a Utah appellate court to 
interpret section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), the Court should hear oral argument. 
Dated this £ 7 day of December 2004. 
DAVID B. THOMPSON /J 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on December 27, 2004,1 served the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
on the attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee by mailing two copies, with postage prepaid, in 
an envelope addressed to: 
David M. Bennion 
Michael P. Petrogeorge 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 









IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




SUZANNE J. LAMB, 
Defendant. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 020500636 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: June 16, 2004 
The above matter came before the court for decision on 
Defendant's motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion 
for reconsideration. The case was tried to the court on April 15 
and 16 and the court issued its ruling and order on April 20, 
2004. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider and objection to 
proposed order in an unauthorized over length memo (URCP, Rule 
7(c)(2)) on May 12, 2004. Defendant filed a supplemental motion 
to reconsider on May 26, 2004. Plaintiff opposed the first motion 
to reconsider on May 27, 2004. Plaintiff opposed the 
supplemental motion to reconsider on June 8, 2004. Defendant 
filed an unauthorized over length reply memo with respect to the 
supplemental motion on June 15, 2004, though she filed a motion 
to allow such an over length memo. She also filed a reply memo 
with respect to the motion to reconsider on June 15, 2004. The 
court denies that request though the court has considered the 
reply memo. Defendant filed a notice to submit June 15, 2004. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the 
entire file, and concludes as follows. 
The case has been tried. The court did the best it could 
and rendered its ruling. There is no provision for 
reconsideration in our rules of procedure. Defendant raises new 
arguments in the guise of a motion to reconsider in her 
supplemental motion. The argument advanced post-trial was not 
advanced at trial and is waived. The court believes those are all 
untimely and are all simply an attempt to convince the court of 
the correctness of defendant's position, which arguments the 
court heard and determined at trial. 
Plaintiff asserts that it provided the proposed order to 
defendant on April 21, 2004. The court has not seen the proposed 
order but if that is true the motion to reconsider and objection 
are not timely. Even if timely, the court rejects the arguments 
as it did at trial. The cou 
stands on whatever merit it 
was wrong she is aware of he 
court to retry the matter on 
memoranda. The court reject 
made in unauthorized over le 
the merits for the reasons s 
for the reasons advanced by 
relating to these motions. 
rt ruled as it did. The ruling 
has. If defendant believes the court 
r remedy, and it is not to ask the 
pleadings unauthorized over length 
s the arguments of defendant as being 
ngth memos, as being untimely, and on 
tated by the court in its ruling and 
plaintiff in the oppositions memos 
The motion to allow an over length memo is denied. The 
motion for reconsideration is denied. The supplemental motion 
for reconsideration is denied. The court will examine the 
proposed order when it is received and if the court believes 
further hearing is necessary it will schedule a hearing. If the 
court believes the proposed order reflects the court's ruling the 
court will sign the order. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this day of 
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DISTRICT COURT J U D » / o ^ 5 S > 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




SUZANNE J. LAMB, 
Defendant. 
SUZANNE J. LAMB 
Counterclaim plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT PEARSON dba ROBERT PEARSON 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Counterclaim defendant. 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 020500636 LM 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
* * * * * * * * 
604545.1 
Pursuant to Rules 7(f) and 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and based on the 
Memorandum Decision dated April 20, 2004, the Court hereby ORDERS, JUDGES and 
DECREES as follows: 
1. Defendant Suzanne J. Lamb ("Mrs. Lamb") is liable on plaintiff Robert Pearson 
(lfMr. Peaison") first cause of action for breach of contract, and judgment is hereby entered in 
favor of Mr. Pearson and against Mrs. Lamb in the amount of $19,023, plus statutory interest 
pursuant at the rate of 10% per annum, commencing July 10, 2002, and continuing until of this 
judgment; 
2. Mr. Pearson has fully complied with the requirements of the Utah Mechanics' Lien 
Act, U.C.A. §§ 38-1-1 et a/., and holds a valid and enforceable mechanics' lien against Mrs. 
Lamb's real property located at 2547 Holiday Ranch Loop Road, Park City, Utah, and more 
particularly described as follows: 
Parcel #PKM-82 
All of Lot 82, PARK MEADOWS SUBDIVISION #1 
SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat thereof as filed in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, Utah. 
A judgment of lien foreclosure is therefore entered in favor of Mr. Pearson and against Mrs. 
Lamb in the amount of $17,998.97, plus interest at the statutory rate of 10% per annum from July 
10, 2002, and continuing until the date of this judgment, plus lien filing fees of $100.00, plus 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $ 42,379-37. 
3. Mr. Pearson is not liable on Mrs. Lamb's counterclaim for breach of contract, and 
judgment is entered in favor of Mr. Pearson and against Mrs. Lamb on that claim; 
*AA<A< I 2 
4, The judgment amounts set forth herein shall continue to accrue interest at the 
statutory legal rate from the date set forth on this judgment until paid in full, and may also be 
augmented by any additional reasonable attorneys* fees and costs necessary to collect the 
judgment. 
DATED this W ) day of July, 2004. 
BRUCE LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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